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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oOo
REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
BRIEF OF PROPOSED
INTERVENOR AND
APPELLANT

-vBONNIE LOU DOMAN and
TODD HADLEY,
Defendants and Respondents,
-vSCOTT DUKE,

Case No. 20838

Proposed Intervenor and
Appellant.
oOo
BRIEF OF PROPOSED INTERVENOR AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Court err in denying Scott Duke's Motion to

Intervene?
2.

Did the Court err in granting Republic's Motion for

Summary Judgment?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the granting of a Summary
Judgment and the denial of a Motion to Intervene in a
Declaratory Judgment action in the Second Judicial District
Court of Davis County.

Republic Insurance Group sought a

declaratory judgment that a Republic Insurance Group policy
issued to Bonnie Lou Doman did not afford coverage to Doman
due to the alleged intentional acts committed by Todd Hadley

(the son of Bonnie Lou Doman) on Scott Duke (R-4).

In order

to adequately protect his interests, Duke attempted to
intervene as a Defendant pursuant to the provisions of Rule
24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the
alternative, Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(R-55).

Prior to Duke's Motion for Intervention, Republic

moved the court for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-25).

Republic's Motion

for Summary Judgment was based upon the failure of
Hadley/Doman to respond timely to Plaintiff's Requests for
Admission (R-29)•

Duke appeals from the ruling on Motion to

Intervene (R-90) and the Ruling on Motion for Summary
Judgment (R-92).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 5, 1983, Scott Duke and Todd Hadley were
involved in an incident resulting in injuries to Duke,
allegedly having been caused by Hadley (R-2).

Duke filed a

Complaint against Hadley and his mother, Bonnie Lou Doman, in
the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, State of
Utah, Civil Number 35245 (R-3).
Republic provided Homeowner's Insurance coverage to
Doman (R-2).

Doman's insurance policy provided coverage for

personal liability (R-3).

However, the policy contained

certain exclusionary provisions which would deny coverage for
an intentional act (R-3).

-2-

Republic brought the instant action seeking a
Declaratory Judgment that Doman's policy did not afford
coverage for any liability which may have resulted from Duke
-v- Hadley and Doman, Civil Number 35245, Second Judicial
District Court, Davis County, State of Utah (R-l through 5).
On February 25, 1985, Republic submitted
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Request for
Production of Documents to Hadley and Doman (R-21f 23). By
April 26, 1985, Doman/Hadley had not responded to the
discovery requests (R-29) and Republic moved for Summary
Judgment based upon Doman/Hadley's failure to deny the
Requests for Admission (R-25, 29).
On May 14f 1985, Duke, pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the
alternative Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
moved the court for leave to intervene (R-55).

Duke had not

been made a party to the instant action (R-2) and only became
aware that the possibility of Summary Judgment was imminent
through a conversation with Doman/Hadley' s counsel (R-56).
Duke filed a "Motion for Intervention as Defendant" (R-55
through 59) and an "Answer in Intervention" (R-60 through 63).
Duke alleged that the representation of his interests by
Doman and Hadley was inadequate and that he would, or may, be
bound by a judgment in the declaratory action (R-85).

-3-

In its "Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment" the court
stated:
The Defendant's failure to answer or
otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Request
for Admissions within the required thirty
days has resulted in the same being
admitted, pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 36 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
As such, Defendants have admitted each
and every material fact at issue in this
Declaratory action and Plaintiff is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
(R-92).
The court then used this rationale in its "Ruling on
Motion to Intervene" when it stated "Since the Plaintiff has
been granted Summary Judgment, there is nothing left for
Scott Duke to intervene in." (R-90, 91). The court then
issued a formal judgment and order in conformity with its
Memorandum Decisions and signed both the Order denying Motion
to Intervene and the Summary Judgment on July 15, 1985,
(R-94, 97). Duke filed his Notice of Appeal on August 13,
1985 (R-99, 100).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Duke's interest in this case is different from that of
any existing party.

Duke's interest is not being adequately

represented by any of the parties.

Relevant precedent makes

it clear that representation is not adequate if the original
party is not diligent in defending the action or allows a
default to be entered.

In this case, the effect of the

granting of Summary Judgment was identical to the entrance of
a default.

Either would foreclose any further action to
-4-

protect the proposed intervener's interest.

Close

"cooperation" between Republic and Doman/Hadley also
illustrates an absence of the adverserial relationship
essential to a fair litigation of the coverage issue.
Duke's interest will be impaired in the Declaratory
Judgment action.

This impairment is sufficient to meet the

requirement of being "bound" by a judgment as required by
Rule 24(a)f Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Duke, having met all the requirements for intervention
as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, was entitled to such intervention.
It was, therefore, error for the court to deny Duke's
Motion for Intervention.
Relevant case law purports to limit Duke's right to
intervene in this case.

However, on further examination, it

is clear that this case is limited by its facts to joinder
under Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and cannot be
extended to intervention under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Furthermore, the purported "holding" in such case

clearly goes beyond the issues presented on appeal.
Therefore, such "holding" goes into an area of supposition by
the court and is mere dicta.
Duke also met the requirements for permissive
intervention under Rule 24 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The questions of law and fact relating to
-5-

liability under Doman's policy are common to all parties
involved.

Duke was a proper party to the declaratory

judgment even though his claim against Republic was
contingent upon securing a Judgment against Doman/Hadley.
It was an abuse of discretion for the court to deny
Duke's Motion to Intervene.
The court must also analyze the propriety of the trial
court's Summary Judgment.

If Duke's appeal of the denial of

Motion to Intervene is successful/ and if the court refuses
to reverse the Summary Judgment/ then Duke is left with the
right to intervene in a suit which is already decided;
right which in such a situation is worthless.

a

A review of

the Summary Judgment is a necessary corollary to the
examination of Duke's right to intervene.

A R G U M E N T
POINT ONE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DUKE'S
MOTION TO INTERVENE.
A.

Duke was entitled to Intervention of Right under the
terms of Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
intervention of right is available when the representation of
the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be
inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by the
judgment. (Add. x)

-6-

In analyzing the interpretation of this Rule, the court
held in Lima -v- Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982), that:
"Adequacy of representation generally turns on whether there
is an identity or divergence of interest between the
potential intervenor and an original party and on whether
that interest is diligently represented.

657 P.2d at 283.

(Citations omitted.)
The court added that where a proposed intervener's
interest is different from an existing party, the
intervener's interest is not represented.

657 P.2d at 283.

In this case, Republic's interest is to have the actions of
Hadley declared to be willful and deliberate, thereby
avoiding liability under Doman's insurance policy. Duke,
having suffered serious injuries at the hands of Hadley, is
interested in maintaining the potential for recovery of
damages should he prove victorious in his suit. Doman and
Hadley are interested in bringing the whole matter to a close
as soon as possible with little regard for the amount of
damages awarded.

It is, therefore, clear that Duke's

interest is different from that of any existing party and it
is, therefore, not represented.
In Lima, an automobile liability insurance carrier
attempted to intervene as of right as a defendant in a tort
action between its insured and an uninsured motorist tortfeasor.

The trial court denied intervention and the supreme

court reversed.

657 P.2d at 280.
-7-

The Lima court enunciated an additional analytical
tool:
Closely related to the question of similarity
of interests is whether the interests of the
applicant, even if assumed to be represented,
is represented diligently. Representation is
considered to be inadequate if the original
party is not diligent in the prosecution or
defense of the action or allows a default
judgment to be entered.
657 P.2d at 283. [Emphasis added.]

Since Doman/Hadley failed to respond to discovery in a
timely manner, and such failure resulted in the entry of
Summary Judgment, Doman/Hadley have obviously not diligently
defended the action.

Since any recovery which Duke may hope

to receive in his action is or may be dependent upon the
outcome of the declaratory action, Duke is a real party in
interest in this action.

The absence of Duke does, as a

practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest.

In fact# if Duke is kept out of the action

between Republic and Doman/Hadley, and the case is decided in
favor of Republic, Duke's claim is in reality defeated in a
proceeding in which he had no chance to participate.
There also exists the possibility of collusion between
Doman/Hadley and Republic.

Republic brought this action to

determine the availability of coverage should the action
against Doman/Hadley result in their liability.

Republic

and Doman/Hadley then become involved in this action in such
-8-

a manner as to terminate any financial responsibility on the
part of Republic for Doman/Hadley1s liability.

This was, of

course, due to the failure of Doman/Hadley's attorney to
respond timely to discovery requests.

It is obvious that in

the event there is no insurance for Doman/Hadley•s liability,
then Duke will be in the unenviable position of suffering
serious injuries at the hands of a party who is unable to
respond in damages.
In examining a similar set of circumstances, the Lima
court noted:

"The close cooperation between Plaintiff

and defendant in resolving the liability issue in this case
evidences an absence of the adverse relationship essential to
a full and fair litigation of the damage issue."
283.

657 P. 2d at

Such potential "cooperation" between Republic and

Doman/Hadley seems to be exactly that which the court had in
mind when discussing diligence of representation.
Neither is it legitimate to argue that the supervision
of the trial court has adequately protected Duke's interest.
In determining whether the interests of a defaulting
defendant (and hence the interest of the potential
intervenor) were adequately protected by the trial court, the
court has noted:
We think the argument that relators interest
will be "adequately represented" in respect
to Count 1 because the court required proof
of Plaintiff's cause is specious. It is not
the duty of the trial court to subpoena and
interrogate witnesses who might contradict
-9-

the testimony of plaintiffs or those who
might testify to compelling facts which show
that plaintiff is not "legally entitled to
recover" the damages he claims. The court
cannot, and should not, act as attorney for
the defaulting defendants. Every practicing
lawyer knows that, insofar as the issues of
fact are concerned, the defaulting defendants
are not "adequately represented".
Lima -v- Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 283-284 (Utah,
1982) (quoting State -v- Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343,
346 (Mo. App. 1963) ) .
Duke's interest was not, therefore, adequately
represented in the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Even if representation of Duke's interest by the
existing parties is inadequate, in order to intervene as of
right, pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Duke must still demonstrate that he is or may be bound by
judgment in the action.
In Centurion Corp. -v- Cripp, 577 P.2d 955 (Utah, 1978),
the court stated that Rule 24 should be liberally construed
to achieve the purpose of eliminating unnecessary duplication
of litigation.

This sentiment was also echoed by Lima -v-

Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982).

The Lima court then

added that, in order to effectuate the liberal construction
of Rule 24, the "bound" requirement would be met by a showing
that the judgment would in some way impair the applicant's
interest.

657 P.2d at 284.

As demonstrated herein, if Duke

is not allowed to intervene and if the Summary Judgment is
allowed to stand, then Duke will effectively have lost his
-10-

right to recover for injuries which he has suffered at the
hands of Hadley.

Furthermore, Duke will have lost this right

in a proceeding in which he was not allowed to participate.
A clearer example of impairment of an applicant's interest
cannot be found.
Duke is or may be bound by the judgment and, having met
all the requirements for intervention as of right pursuant to
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he was entitled to
intervention as of right.

It was error for the court to deny

his Motion for Intervention.
B.

The relevant portion of the court's opinion in Utah
Farm Bureau Insurance Company -v- Chugg, 6 Utah 2d
399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957) goes beyond the facts of
such case and is, therefore, dicta.

In the case of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company -vChugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957), the court analyzed
a suit brought for declaratory judgment to determine the
rights of an insurance company under an automobile insurance
policy.

The policy contained an exclusion clause which

suspended all coverage when the car was being operated by a
driver who was under the influence of alcohol.

The court

noted that the "insurance company should not be permitted to
delay the main action

for the purpose of determining in

advance whether it should defend Chugg in that action".
P.2d at 281.

315

The injured party had been forced into the case

by joinder under Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

-11-

The court then went on to note:

"

we want to repel

any inference which may be drawn from this opinion that one
who claims to be damaged by the negligent act of another is a
proper party to an action by the insurer of the latter under
a public liability policyf whereby a declaratory judgment is
sought declaring the legal effects of the terms of such
policy."

345 P.2d at 281.

The court clearly did not analyze

the propriety of intervention in such a case.

By its factsf

Chugq is limited in application to cases where the injured
third party is forced into the case through joinder.
In this case, Republic brought a declaratory judgment
action against Doman/Hadley seeking an order that Republic's
insurance policy would not provide coverage in the event
Doman/Hadley were held liable to Duke.

Counsel for

Doman/Hadley refused to respond to discovery requests.
Thereafter, Republic moved for summary judgment based on such
refusal.

Republic's Summary Judgment was granted.

For all

practical purposes this defeated Duke's original suit against
Doman/Hadley.

In Chugq, however, the coverage issue was

being diligently represented by the insurance counsel.

This

is obviously not the case in Republic -v- Doman/Hadley.
A further distinction between the case at hand and Chugq
is that the Chugq holding is, in fact, dicta.

-12-

The Chugg case involved a suit for declaratory judgment
by an insurer against the insured and the automobile driver
who was in an accident with the insured.

The case was

brought to determine the insurer's right under the automobile
liability insurance policy.

After addressing the issues

presented, the Court goes on to note that in the event the
tort victim had objected to joinder "

it would have been

error to have compelled his joinder even under the most
liberal view of Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."

315

P.2d at 381.
As stated previously, the court then adds that the tort
victim would not be a proper party to declaratory judgment
declaring the liability of the insurer.

This language,

however, clearly goes beyond the issues presented in the case
and into an area of supposition by the court.

The issue on

appeal was whether or not the insurance company was obligated
to defend the suit because Chugg was driving under the
influence of alcohol and, whether the coverage under the
policy was suspended by virtue of its exclusion clause.
315 P.2d at 278.
The court thoroughly analyzed the affect of testimony
about the alcoholic content of Chugg's blood sample which was
admitted over Chugg f s objection.

The court also examined the

issue of admitting in evidence Chugg1s plea of guilty to
drunken driving.

The court held that both of these items

were reversible error.

After so holding and disposing of the
-13-

issues on appeal, the court then goes on to examine the
joinder of the tort victim in a declaratory judgment between
the insurer and the insured.

The court at no time discusses

whether intervention is permissible in such a case.
Therefore, such language purporting to limit the availability
of intervention is dicta and is no part of the holding of the
case.
Furthermore, later cases make it clear that the modern
trend favors a liberal interpretation of Rule 24 and a
generous granting of intervention.

See, e.g. State Farm Fire

and Casualty Company -v- Reuter, 294 Or. 446, 657 P. 2d 1231
(1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Or. 155, 700 P.2d 236
(1985).

Insurance Company of Pennsylvania -v- Lumberman's

Mutual Casualty Company, 405 Pa. 613, 177 A.2d 94 (1962).
C. Duke was entitled to permissive intervention under
the terms of Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
If Duke was not entitled to intervention as of right, he
was most assuredly entitled to permissive intervention under
Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (App. x ) . Cases
which are supportive of intervention in Duke's situation have
frequently done so on the theory that the interest of the
intervenor arises out of the same contract and is governed by
the same occurrences.

"The questions of law and fact

relating to liability under the policy are common to both.
If, therefore, [Duke] is not a necessary and indispensable
party, [he] is assuredly an interested and proper party to
-14-

the declaratory action."

Franklin Life Insurance Company -v-

Johnson, 157 F.2d 653f 658 (10th Cir. 1946).
In the Franklin Life case, the insurance company brought
a declaratory action for a determination of liability under
an insurance contract issued on the life of the son of the
defendant.

The complaint alleged the death of the insured as

a result of self-inflicted gunshot wounds.

The risk was

specifically exempt from the coverage of the accidental death
benefit provisions in the policy.

The court noted:

In declaratory actions brought to determine
coverage under an insurance policy issued to
protect the insured against liability
to third persons, third persons asserting
such liability have been held to be proper
parties to a declaratory judgment proceeding,
although their claims against an insurer are
contingent upon recovery of a judgment against
the insured. Ordinarily in an action for
declaratory judgment, all persons interested
in the declaration are necessary parties. 157
F.2d at 658. [Emphasis added.] (Citations
omitted.)
The Supreme Court also analyzed this issue in Maryland
Casualty Co. -v- Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270
(1941).

In that case, Maryland Casualty issued an automobile

liability policy in which it agreed to indemnify the insured
for any sums the insured might be required to pay to third
parties.

The insurance company also agreed that it would

defend any action covered by the policy which was brought
against the insured.

While the policy was in force, there

was a collision involving a third party and an employee of
the insured.
court.

The third party brought an action in state

The insurance company then brought an action in
-15-

federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that
the vehicle involved in the collision was not one hired by
the insured and, therefore, that the insurance company was
not liable to defend the action.

The court noted:

"It is

clear that there is an actual controversy between the
insurance company and the insured."

312 U.S. at 274,

The

insured had demurred to the complaint on the ground that it
did not state a cause of action against him.

The court then

held that there was an actual controversy between the
insurance company and the injured third party.

There is

reference in the court's opinion to the deleterious effect
that a contrary decision would have on the uniformity of
federal and state court judgments.

However, it is still

clear that in a declaratory judgment action brought to
determine coverage under an insurance policy issued to
protect the insured against liability to third persons, such
third persons are proper parties to a declaratory judgment
proceeding.
All requirements having been met, it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to deny permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
POINT TWO
THE COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF JULY 15,
1985, AGAINST DOMAN AND HADLEY, MUST AS
A COROLLARY TO THE MOTION TO INTERVENE,
BE REVIEWED THROUGH THIS APPEAL.
In order to accord full relief to Duke, it is imperative
that the court analyze the propriety of the trial court's
-16-

summary judgment against Doman/Hadley.

In the event that

Duke's appeal on the denial of the Motion to Intervene is
successful, it would be a hollow victoryf indeed, if the
trial court's Summary Judgment against Doman and Hadley were
to stand.

The court's analysis of the trial court's Summary

Judgment is a necessary corollary to the court's review of
the denial of the Motion to Intervene.

Furthermore, 4

Am.Jur.2df Appeal and Errory § 175 (1962), states in part:
"In some jurisdictions it has been held that a stranger whose
application for leave to intervene has been denied may appeal
from the final judgment in the cause."
The view that a stranger whose application for leave to
intervene has been denied may appeal from final judgment on
the cause is also supported by League of United Latin
American Citizens -v- Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 527 S.W. 2d 507
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) cert, denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).

See

also cases annotated at 15 A.L.R. 2d 336, at § 8 (1951).
Similarly, the court in Commercial Block Realty Co. -vU. S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081
(1934) noted that:
It is often the case that an intervener
has more interest in the subject matter
of litigation then either the plaintiff
or the defendant, to deny an intervener
in such case the right to intervene or
to say that he could not be heard to
appeal from a judgment denying him such
a right would be most unusual.
28 P.2d at 1082.
-17-

It would also be most unusual to deny him a right to
have the entire panorama of his claims examined, instead of
merely a review of the denial of his right to intervene.
Therefore, in order to successfully and adequately review
this casef it is imperative that the Order Granting Summary
Judgment also be reviewed.

To allow only an appeal of the

Order Denying Intervention is to deny Duke an opportunity to
present his claim.
C O N C L U S I O N
Based upon the facts and the law stated herein,
Appellant respectfully requests that the Order Granting
Summary Judgment and the Order Denying Motion to Intervene
be reversed and that this case be remanded for a trial with
an opinion which is instructive with respect to the issues
raised herein.
DATED this

J^
of November, 1985.
KING & KING

BV!

Jfa*, 16e£A-

GLEN T. CELLA, Esquire
Attorney for Scott Duke
Proposed Intervenor-Appellant
251 East 200 South
P. 0. Box 220
Clearfield, Utah 84015
Telephone: (801) 825-2202
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A D D E N D U M

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFiCF

In the District Court of the Second Judicial DfatttfS

COUNTY. UTAH

BBS JUN 21 P H 3 48

IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah

MICHAEL G.ALLPHIN. CLERK
2HD DISTRICT COURT

-<fi

•BY:

0EPU7Y CLERK

REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION
TO INTERVENE

vs.

Civil No. 36730

BONNIE LOU DOMAN, et al.,
Defendant.

The motion of Scott Duke to intervene came before the
court on June 11, 1985, for oral argument, with Felshaw King
appearing for Scott Duke, Heinz J. Mahler appearing for the
plaintiff and Steven Lee Payton appearing for the defendants.
After oral argument, the court took the motion under advisement.

The court now rules on the motion.
Scott Duke relies heavily on the case of Lima vs. Cham-

bers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982).

In that case the Supreme

Court said:
"When intervention is permitted, the intervener
must accept the pending action as he finds it; his
right to litigate is only as broad as that of the
other parties to the action."

(657 P.2d at 284-5)

Irrespective of whether Scott Duke is a proper party to this action or not, he must accept the case as it is.
status of the case.

On April 26, 1985, the plaintiff filed a

motion for summary judgment.
to that motion.

What is the

The defendants failed to respond

On May 8, 1985, the plaintiff filed a request

for ruling on its motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule
2.8 of the Rules of Practice and waived oral argument.
fendants have not responded to this motion.

The de-

The case is, there-

fore , in a position for a ruling on the motion for summary judgment.

This court has this day ruled on plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment and has granted the same.

Since the plaintiff

FILMED

-2has been granted summary judgment/ there is nothing left for
Scott Duke to intervene in.
The motion of Scott Duke to intervene in this action is
denied.
Dated June 20, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:

/

This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Heinz J. Mahler, 600
Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Steven
Lee Payton, 431 South 300 East, Suite 40, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; and Felshaw King, P. 0. Box 220, Clearfield, Utah 84015
on June 21, 1985.
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial D i s t r i c t s
County of Davis, State of Utah

MICHAEL G.AILPHIN. CLERK
2ND DISTRICT COURT

BY.
REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP,

0

OEPUTY CLERK

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

Civil No. 36730

BONNIE LOU DOMAN, et al.,
Defendant.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was filed with
the court on April 26, 1985.
the motion.

The defendants did not respond to

On May 8, 1985, the plaintiff filed a motion re-

questing the court to rule on its motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice and waived oral
argument.

On May 1 4 , 1985, Scott Duke filed a motion for in-

tervention as a defendant.

On June 11, 1985, both Heinz J.

Mahler, counsel for the plaintiff, and Steven Lee Payton, counsel for the defendants were before the court on a motion by
Scott Duke to intervene in this action.

Neither counsel indi-

cated any intention of doing anything more with regard to the
motion for summary judgment.

The court now rules on the motion

for summary judgment.
On February 25, 1985, the plaintiff served upon defendants
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of documents.

Over three months have passed and neither

defendant has responded to said requests.

The defendants' fail-

ure to ansver or otherwise respond to plaintiff's requests for
admissions within the required thirty days has resulted in the
same being admitted, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 36 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.

As such, defendants have admitted

each and every material fact at issue in this declaratory action
and plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.

in
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IN AND FOR THE

Plaintiff,

COUNTY.
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-2The plaintiff is directed to draw a formal order in conformity
with this ruling*
Dated June 20, 1985.
BY THE COURT:
/

Bte^J-

/
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Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Heinz J. Mahler, 600
Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Steven
Lee Payton, 431 South 300 East, Suite 40, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; and Felshaw King, P. O. Box 220, Clearfield, Utah 84015
on June 21, 1985.

e p u t y XclerJc

iv

FILED IH CLERK'S 0FF1CF
DAY'.S COUHTY. UTAH

1985 JUL 15 AM 10 4 9
MICHAEL G..\U.PKm. CLERK
'
2KO DISTRICT COURT
D. GARY CHRISTIAN
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BY.

DEPUTY CLERK

KIPP and CHRISTIAN. P.C
ATTORNEYS FOR P l a i n t i f f
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP,

:

Plaintiff,

ORDER

:

vs.

:

BONNIE LOU DOMAN and
TODD HADLEY,

:
Civil No. 36730

Defendants.

H

The Motion of Scott Duke to Intervene in this matter
came on regularly before the Court on June 11, 1985, Scott Duke
represented by Felshaw King, plaintiff Republic Insurance Group
represented by Heinz J. Mahler and defendants represented by
Steven Lee Payton, the Court having heard the argument of the
parties and being fully advised in the premises, and pursuant to
the Court's ruling on Motion to Intervene dated June 20, 1985;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That the Motion of Scott Duke to Intervene in this

action is denied.
DATED this

/r

day of

, S,sA,

, 1985,
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BY THE COURT:

y

/

/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED, postage prepaid, pursuant to Rule 2.9, this
24th day of June, 1985, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order, to the following:
Steven Lee Payton
Attorney for Defendants
Suite 40
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Felshaw King
Attorney for Scott Duke
251 East 200 South
Clearfield, Utah 84015
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G85 JUL 15 AHKM9
MICHAEL G. ALLPHIK. CLERK
2ND DISTRICT COURT

D. GARY CHRISTIAN
HEINZ J. MAHLER

BY.

DEPUTY CLERK

KIPP and CHRISTIAN PC
ATTORNEYS FOR
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
BONNIE LOU DOMAN and
TODD HADLEY,

Civil No. 36730

Defendants.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed April
26, 1985, came on regularly before the Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby, Judge of the above-entitled Court, the Court being fully
advised in the premises and pursuant to the Court's ruling on
Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 20, 1985,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That the Republic Insurance Policy #5150860 issued

to Bonnie Lou Doman does not afford or in any provide coverage
to Bonnie Lou Doman nor to Todd Hadley in the case of Scott Duke
vs. Todd Hadley and Bonnie Lou Doman, Civil No. 35245, filed in
the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah.
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2.

That neither the Republic Insurance Group nor any

of the individual insurance company members of the group have any
obligation to defend or otherwise represent Bonnie Lou Doman nor
Todd Hadley in the case of Scott Duke vs. Todd Hadley and Bonnie
Lou Doman, Civil No, 35245, filed in the Second Judicial District
Court, Davis County, State of Utah, nor to pay or indemnify them
for any judgment which may be awarded in favor of Scott Duke and
against the defendants in said action.
3.

For costs incurred in the sum of $72.75.

DATED this

/S

day of

r/Z/y

BY THE COURT:

.N. RC. I
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, 1985.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED, postage prepaid, pursuant to Rule 2.9, this
24th day of June, 1985, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Judgment, to the following:
Steven Lee Payton
Attorney for Defendants
Suite 40
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Felshaw King
Attorney for Scott Duke
251 East 200 South
Clearfield, Utah 84015
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RULE 24
INTERVENTION
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant
is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant
is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control
or disposition of the court or an officer thereof.

(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may
be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.
When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon
any statute or executive order administered by a governmental officer
or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued
or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency
upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In
exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct
manually signed copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PROPOSED
INTERVENOR AND APPELLANT to:
D. Gary Christian, Esquire
Heinz J. Mahler, Esquire
Attorneys at Law
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Steven L. Payton, Esquire
Attorney at Law
431 South 300 East
Suite 40
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid, this 22nd day of November, 1985.

GLEN T. CELLA, Esquire

